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ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND SEVENTY--SIXTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 26 July 1966, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS (Canada)

THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A.F. AZEREDO da SILVEIRA

Mr. G. de CARVALHO SILOS

Mr. A. da COSTA GUIMARAES

Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LUKANOV

Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV

Mr. D. POPOV

Mr. T. DAMIANOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. C.J. MARSHALL

Mr. P.D. LEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. Z. CERNIK

Mr. V. VAJNAR

Mr. R. KLEIN

Ethiopia:

Mr. A. ABERRA

Mr. A. ZELLEKE

Mr. B. ASSFAW

India:

Mr. V.C. TRIVEDI

Mr. K. P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

Mr. S. AVETTA

Mr. F. SORO

Mexico:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLED0

Mr. M. TELLO MACIAS

Nigeria:

Mr. G.O. IJEWERE

Mr. M.B. BRIMAH

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Mr. B. KAJDY

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU

Mr. E. GLASER

Mr. C. UNGUREANU

Mr. A. COROIANU

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL

Mr. H. BLIX

Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD

Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. A.A. ROSHCIN

Mr. I.I. CHEPROV

Mr. M.P. SHELEPIN

Mr. V.B. TOULINOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. H. KHALLAF

Mr. A. OSMAN

Mr. M. KASSEM

Mr. A.A. SALAM

United Kingdom:

Sir Harold BEELEY

Mr. J.G. TAHOURDIN

Miss E.J.M. RICHARDSON

United States of America:

Mr. A.S. FISHER

Mr. L. WEILER

Mr. C.G. BREAM

Mr. A. NEIDLE

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. O. FREY

The CHAIRMAN (Canada): I declare open the two hundred and seventy-sixth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. LUKANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from Russian): In the course of the debate on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, besides statements prompted by the desire to help our work and to find a possible compromise, we have heard statements in which there has again appeared an unhealthy tendency to replace the present business-like approach by a seemingly concrete analysis. It is proposed, as has happened many times in the past, that the Committee should deal with secondary and tertiary details without agreeing beforehand on the very essence of the future treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Once again the meaning of the proposals of the socialist countries is being distorted, and once again their insistent demand for strict adherence to the unambiguous spirit and letter of the United Nations resolution on non-proliferation (A/RES/2028(XX); ENDC/161) is being represented as sheer stubbornness.

It seems to us that, before finishing the discussion on this question, it would be worth while to try to get a clear idea of the nature of the differences that have appeared. Do these differences arise, for example, from the fact that one of the draft treaties submitted to us was written originally in Russian and the other in English? Do these differences derive from pride of authorship, from differing linguistic or stylistic ways of expressing identical correct principles? Of course not. The point is not the language, the translation or the style of the wording. The point is that one draft does not permit proliferation of nuclear weapons whereas the other does.

There can be no compromise on this. Here the advocates of non-proliferation must be "stubborn": that is, they must not depart from the principles of General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX), which reflects an objective requirement of international life. As Mr. Ijewere said at the meeting of 5 May, "It does not leave room for a half-way house between proliferation and non-proliferation -- you either proliferate or you do not." (ENDC/PV.262, p.16)

Either the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in any form whatever, or the proliferation of these weapons irrespective of the form which it might take -- that is the question. It is useless to imitate a certain priest who baptized a hen as

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a fish, so as to be able to eat it on Friday. That is precisely what those are doing who want proliferation restricted by their interests and camouflaged by some sort of "veto", electronic locks and so forth, and to be called on that account non-proliferation. As can easily be seen, the differences between the two positions are great.

What is our starting-point and what, in our opinion, should be the starting-point of everyone, in analyzing the two draft treaties on non-proliferation before us? We start from the way in which the two drafts solve the main question which is the subject of the treaty: that is, how and to what extent they bar all possible ways and forms of proliferation of nuclear weapons. In the Eighteen-Nation Committee there are no two opinions about the fact that it is the Soviet, not the United States draft, which bars all ways and forms of access to nuclear weapons by States not at present possessing them.

We have read and re-read the records of the meetings of the Committee and we find in them various kinds of comments on the Soviet draft (ENDC/164), but not a single word to the effect that this draft permits even the smallest deviation from the objective of preventing any possibility of the proliferation of nuclear weapons or the creation of a privileged nuclear status for non-nuclear States members of military alliances. Precisely the contrary. The Western delegations see the main defect of the Soviet draft precisely in the fact that it closes all ways to proliferation too hermetically. The Soviet draft does not permit, as the Western delegations put it, even "consultations" between allies on problems of nuclear strategy, nor does it exclude the NATO military alliance from the scope of the non-proliferation treaty.

I should now like to dwell very briefly on these arguments of the Western delegations. But first of all I must state that the Bulgarian delegation fully agreed with all that was said at the last meeting of the Committee by the delegations of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. It is impossible to put forward a single objection to their analyses of the Soviet and United States draft treaties. Would

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anyone venture, for example, to refute Mr. Roshchin, when he listed everything that the United States draft (ENDC/152 and Add.1) would permit to an existing non-nuclear State allied with the United States if an agreement on non-proliferation were to be based on this United States draft? (ENDC/PV.275, pp.22 ot seq.)

Beginning with the acquisition of physical access to nuclear weapons on their own territories, the allies of the United States would also acquire the ability to wage a nuclear war on any scale they liked; and this situation is presented to us as "non-proliferation" solely on the ground that the will of these allies of the United States would allegedly be restrained by the "concurrent" consent of the owner of the nuclear weapons. But in actual fact it would turn out, as the delegation of the Soviet Union has stated, that an ally of the United States equipped with United States nuclear weapons would be able to fire these weapons "only" in two cases: when it has the consent of the United States, and when it has not.

It is understandable and natural that no State concerned with its security can possibly accept this pseudo-non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Until nuclear weapons are destroyed -- and their destruction is the subject of international negotiations -- everyone prefers that there should be no need for a United States "veto": that is, that United States nuclear weapons should not be given to other States which might manipulate and use these weapons after setting aside the "veto" in one way or another. Until mankind gets rid of the nuclear threat, everyone also prefers that "electronic locks" and similar devices should not be exhibited as safeguards of security. This should be sought in non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, not in proliferation under the protection of these electronic locks.

Speaking of the allies of the United States in military blocs, I must make in passing the following comments. We are not aware that all the allies of the United States are demanding access to nuclear weapons. But we do know, and everyone else knows, that only one State is making this demand. There is no need to name it -- it is known on account of the past deeds of its predecessors, its present territorial claims, and the unrestrained growth of its appetite for every sort of armaments.

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The question arises how it is possible that the countries which twenty years ago deemed it necessary to disarm completely the successor of the Third Reich should now be preventing the achievement of agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons solely in order to please the inheritors of practically the same policy of military adventures. Alas, the negotiations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee show that this is actually happening. This is the source of the "arguments" of the Western delegations regarding the need for free nuclear "consultations" in the NATO alliance, and to the effect that the future treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should not impede proliferation within an alliance.

Judging by the statements of the representatives of the Western countries, what is meant by "consultations" is the whole complex of nuclear re-armament of their military alliances. How, we are told, is it possible to accumulate nuclear weapons in a foreign country and not to ask the owner of the territory where he deigns to allow these weapons to be stationed? This seemingly innocent way of putting the question of "consultations", not to mention its unsound basis, is merely an initial stage, which is to be followed by a whole series of other "consultations", ending with a decision on how the nuclear weapons are to be fired jointly and at whom.

Is it possible to claim that such a state of affairs is preferable to the situation where nuclear weapons would be solely in the hands of those that now possess them, pending a decision to prohibit and destroy them completely? Can one, for instance, consider that the freedom-loving African States would feel happier if the United States were to give its nuclear weapons to the South African racists, retaining merely a "veto" over their use?

The opinion of the majority of countries in the world is in agreement that it is not nuclear "consultations" between nuclear and non-nuclear Powers that is required, but rather genuine non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, as a first step towards the outlawing of these weapons and their subsequent elimination. Dealing specifically with the situation in the area where the States of NATO and the Warsaw Pact

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are located, the German Democratic Republic, the People's Republic of Poland and other socialist countries have long been proposing a better alternative to nuclear "consultations": namely, refusal to station nuclear weapons in Central Europe, renunciation by both German States of any claim to have access to these weapons, establishment of a denuclearized zone, and many other measures, all of which from the first to the last, taken singly or together, would ensure the normalization of the situation and the elimination of the threat of a nuclear conflict in that part of the world.

The argument in defence of the immunity of military alliances, such as NATO, from the application of an agreement on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons simply does not stand up to criticism. No military alliance can or should hinder the prohibition or limitation of any weapons whatever. This is all the more so when it is a question of nuclear weapons, which have been condemned (A/RES/1653(XVI)) because they are contrary to the spirit of the United Nations Charter and the principle of humanity.

It is indeed strange to hear arguments to the effect that in NATO either there will be joint ownership of nuclear weapons or the very existence of NATO will be undermined. Of course, this assessment of the state of affairs in that alliance does not do it any honour. In this connexion I should like to recall that the socialist and other peace-loving countries, on the very day of its establishment, assessed it as an aggressive military bloc, and that their assessment has proved to be fully justified. This is now further confirmed by the fact that NATO is standing in the way of an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In the July Declaration of the States of the Warsaw Pact it was reaffirmed that they were prepared to dissolve their military organization if the Western Powers, which had initiated the division of the world into military blocs, would agree to take a similar step. However, as is obvious, the West not only regards NATO as essential -- that, of course, is its own affair -- but wants to transform it into an alliance in which the Member States would, so to say on a legal basis, possess nuclear weapons

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with all the ensuing consequences. And so there crops up the demand of the Western delegations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee that their military alliances should be excluded from the scope of the future treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as the demand for "free intra-alliance nuclear consultations" (in other words, intra-alliance proliferation of nuclear weapons). Both of these are contrary to resolution 2028 (XX) of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Consequently the basis for the conclusion of an agreement on this item of our agenda does not yet exist. In that case, what point would there be in concurring the details of the texts of the existing drafts -- say, the position of the commas --, as some delegations suggest? Whether they like it or not, objectively speaking, the concurring of a few phrases not relating to the substance of the problem would be tantamount to a deception of the peoples. Whoever else may do so, the socialist countries have never agreed to a deception either of their own or of other peoples. That is why, in concluding our discussions for 1966 in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament on the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, it would be right not only to note our failure but also to proclaim out loud who is to blame for it. Who are they? That is easily answered.

It would be enough to imagine that one fine day the leaders of the Federal Republic of Germany will announce, following the example of the other German State, the German Democratic Republic, that they do not want any nuclear weapons in their country, that they do not want to have anything to do with them. It would be enough for the United States to announce at the same time that it would cease turning the Federal Republic of Germany into a nuclear magazine or thrusting nuclear weapons into its hands. Unfortunately neither of these events has happened, and that is why there is no agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Obviously further considerable efforts will be needed which should result in the recognition by everyone of the need for a strict ban on all forms of proliferation of the most dangerous weapons known hitherto. We want to believe that this will be so.

Mr. FISHER (United States of America): First of all I should like to express my appreciation both for the kind words of greeting that were extended to me at our last meeting and, more importantly, for the congratulations on the recent United States space activities for peace. I appreciate them very much. At the same time I should like to extend my own greetings to the representative of Sweden, who returned to this table at approximately the same time as I, and to say that I am happy to be returning in such good company.

I returned to the deliberations of this Committee last Thursday. The first speaker on that day was the representative of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Cernik. In listening to the opening portion of his remarks (ENDC/PV.275) I was struck by his very clear statement about the fundamental objective of non-proliferation. As Mr. Cernik stated it, the fundamental objective of non-proliferation is to prevent an increase in the number of States that can start a nuclear war. It doubtless comes as no surprise when I indicate that the United States delegation finds itself in rather deep disagreement with many of Mr. Cernik's later remarks; but we do agree with his premise, which he so clearly and forcefully stated. We agree that the objective of non-proliferation is to prevent an increase in the number of States that can start a nuclear war. In fact, the United States draft non-proliferation treaty (ENDC/152 and Add.1), as we have previously explained, is based upon that fundamental objective.

Unfortunately, there are already too many nuclear-weapon Powers with the ability to trigger a nuclear war. When there was only one nuclear-weapon Power, and that nuclear-weapon Power was the United States, we hoped that there could come into being international arrangements whereby even that one could be eliminated. Our immediate objective now, therefore, is to prevent the present number from being increased.

At the outset of my remarks I should like to address myself to the comments of Mr. Cernik and those of Mr. Roshchin, the representative of the Soviet Union, to the effect that the United States approach to a non-proliferation treaty is deficient because it might permit the United States to give its consent to another country -- here I may add that they seemed primarily concerned with the Federal Republic of Germany, although the arguments are broader in their implication -- to bring upon the entire world the horrors of a nuclear war.

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I am not suggesting that the United States draft treaty represents the final word in perfection. As President Johnson indicated on 5 July, we are prepared to consider compromise language with which both sides can live. But the suggestion that the United States draft is deficient because under it a nuclear-weapon Power might somehow launch a nuclear war by proxy, so to speak, by permitting an ally to do so with its weapons, seems quite unreal. No nuclear-weapon Power could actually evade its responsibility by shunting on to some other State the actual firing of nuclear weapons. We all hope, of course, as earnestly as it is possible to hope for anything in the world, that a nuclear war will never take place. However, if it were to, it would take place only because one of the nuclear-weapon Powers had decided that its nuclear weapons should be fired; and, if it were so to decide, it would have to face the possibility of the gravest of conceivable consequences, no matter from where its weapons had been fired.

I cannot conclude this preliminary portion of my remarks, dealing as they do with such a grim subject as the responsibilities of nuclear-weapon States regarding the decision to begin a nuclear war, without indicating the spirit in which I do so and without indicating the confidence which I believe is developing between the major nuclear-weapon States concerning their responsibility in the management of this awesome power.

It is an inescapable fact that two nuclear-weapon Powers have enormous nuclear arsenals at their disposal. The two Powers to which I refer have now experienced some twenty years of living together in the nuclear age. Those years, as we all know, have not been years solely of co-operation and accord. However, during that time there has developed what I should like to refer to as perhaps a code of responsibility. Nuclear weapons are no longer brandished for political purposes. We both know that, with the overwhelming and awesome nuclear might at each other's disposal, judgement and responsibility are truly inescapable.

The United States draft treaty merely recognizes the realities of the nuclear age and the responsibilities that they entail. We shall not facilitate progress towards the negotiation of a non-proliferation treaty by pretending that those realities and those responsibilities do not exist.

Our purpose here is to negotiate a non-proliferation treaty, and my Government wishes to do just that. I have already referred, as did the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, in his remarks during the last meeting, to a recent statement by

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President Johnson at a press conference on 5 July. President Johnson said that the United States was very anxious to reach a decision on a non-proliferation treaty. He said: "We hope the Soviet Union will meet us and find an acceptable compromise in language which we can both live with." He then added:

"We are going to do everything within the power of our most imaginative people to find language that will bring the nuclear Powers together in a treaty that will provide non-proliferation. We think it is one of the most important decisions of our time and we are going to do everything to bring people together on it."

That statement is an unequivocal reaffirmation that the United States actively and earnestly seeks to negotiate a non-proliferation treaty and that it wants to move ahead right now.

Therefore we must consider what is the best means of making progress at this point, concurrently with a search for a basis for resolving the principal differences among us. We have given this question serious thought and have concluded that the suggestions made by the representatives of Mexico (ENDC/PV.274), Canada (ENDC/PV.275) and Italy (ENDC/PV.265) offer an avenue of progress. We agree with those representatives that indeed there are many areas of agreement between the two drafts on the table, that of the United States and that of the Soviet Union. It seems to us that we can build a bridge of agreement by continuing the process of describing the areas of agreement and then seeking precise formulations in which to record our agreement.

I should now like to mention certain parts of the treaty which we think would be susceptible to useful and productive negotiation along that line right now, at the present stage of our work.

First of all, both draft treaties now on the table begin with a preamble. Although there are some differences, we think that it should not be too difficult to work out an appropriate and helpful set of preambular clauses. The representative of Mexico, Mr. Gomez Robledo, has assisted our work in that regard by discussing the preambles of both drafts and by making certain specific suggestions. In particular, Mr. Gomez Robledo suggested that the authors of the two drafts might:

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"...agree on a text which would not stress so much the greater or lesser latitude of time in their disarmament plans but, on the contrary, would bring out very clearly their common determination, as proclaimed so often by both sides, to initiate and complete as soon as possible the various stages leading to general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." (ENDC/PV.274, p.6)

We think that is a helpful suggestion and we are prepared to consider improvements in the language of the preamble as well as elsewhere.

Moving away from the preamble, I should now like to discuss the portions of articles I and II of the draft treaties on which it might appear to be possible to secure and record agreement now. One such portion consists of clauses in articles I and II of the United States draft treaty and clauses in articles I, II and III of the Soviet draft treaty which relate to the manufacture and assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Other speakers have already pointed out that this area represents one of the core or central concepts in any non-proliferation agreement. With that we wholly agree.

I believe it is fair to state also, in the light of our discussion at the last meeting, that Mr. Roshchin does not disagree with that proposition. However, he seems to be reluctant to undertake the negotiation of proposed treaty clauses relating to the manufacture or assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons, because those concepts are contained in article I and II of the United States draft treaty and because articles I and II are related to article IV, which contains a definition of control which the Soviet delegation finds objectionable.

I think I should point out at this stage that, although other paragraphs of articles I and II of the United States draft treaty do contain references to control and hence involve consideration of article IV of the United States draft treaty, no such reference is found in the clauses of either article I or article II which relate to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or assistance in their manufacture. I think, therefore, that it should be possible to work out mutually-acceptable provisions regarding manufacture and assistance in manufacture without any prejudice to positions regarding article IV of the United States draft treaty.

I wish to assure Mr. Roshchin that, if he will join me as co-Chairman in attempting to work out provisions on manufacture or assistance in manufacture, I shall not in any way attempt to introduce or urge any phrase or concept which could

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in any way prejudice the position of either one of us on the existing differences as they may relate to article IV of the United States draft. I am confident that that can be done and I do hope that the Soviet representative will join me in the attempt.

The representative of India, Mr. Trivedi, stated at our last meeting that obligations regarding the manufacture of nuclear weapons were of great importance to the non-nuclear-weapon States (ENDC/PV.275, p.37). That is undeniably true; and, as a result, the opinions and suggestions of the non-nuclear-weapon States will be most important in this connexion. Those opinions and suggestions will have to be taken fully into account. Of course, any treaty should be acceptable to all if it is to achieve its purposes.

We believe there has also been a certain amount of agreement in principle regarding the desirability of having the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency or equivalent international safeguards play a role in the realization of an effective non-proliferation treaty. The Soviet representative has not yet spoken on that question in detail. However, we might still plan to take up that part of the treaty subsequently with a view to reaching agreed language. I propose to speak on that subject in more detail at a later meeting.

I should like now to turn to articles V and VI of the Soviet and United States draft treaties, which deal with entry into force and withdrawal. In both those articles there is already a large measure of agreement. That is encouraging, because those articles do contain many important provisions notwithstanding the fact that they are sometimes referred to as final or formal clauses. Indeed, on the basis of the experience in the negotiations on the partial test-ban Treaty in Moscow (ENDC/100/Rev.1), I think it is fair to say that those provisions could require detailed and extensive negotiation. However, since there is already a considerable amount of agreement between us on those provisions, should we not now start to record that agreement in agreed language?

At our last meeting Mr. Roshchin suggested that it was not possible to reach agreement on a withdrawal clause until one knew exactly what treaty one might be withdrawing from. However, I must say, with all respect, that I disagree with the Soviet representative on that point. We do know what kind of treaty we are negotiating. There is a large amount of agreement between us regarding the substantive provisions of the treaty. The co-Chairmen could agree quite rapidly on a withdrawal clause. I propose that we do so.

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

The method of negotiation suggested by the representatives of Mexico and Italy and by yourself as representative of Canada, Mr. Chairman, is in no way unusual. In innumerable negotiations it is the practice first to tackle areas where there is a measure of agreement, setting aside temporarily areas where there is not agreement. You, Sir, in your capacity as representative of Canada have suggested for our assistance a convenient way of recording agreed articles: we could place them in the middle column of the Canadian working paper (ENDC/175).

Contrary to suggestions made at our last meeting, that procedure would not mislead anyone. It would not deceive public opinion. On the contrary, if we followed that procedure, everyone could see where we have been able to agree and could just as well see where we have not been able to agree. In all frankness, I must repeat that it is impossible for me to see how anybody at all could be fooled. What that procedure might accomplish, however, is the recording of a large measure of progress. We have a great many provisions to negotiate, and the sooner we begin negotiating some of them the better.

My delegation wishes to believe that all other delegations here sincerely desire to make rapid progress on our task. If that is the case, we can surely do so by broadening and specifying areas of agreement rather than by repeating arguments about those parts of the treaty where we do not at present agree. I request my Soviet co-Chairman to join me in this common endeavour to widen and record areas of agreement.

Mr. Azeredo da SILVEIRA (Brazil): In accordance with the established practice in this Committee, I intend to speak today on the question of the prohibition of underground nuclear tests.

It has often been said -- in view of the difficulties which up to now have prevented an agreement on a non-proliferation treaty -- that we should concentrate our efforts on another extremely urgent matter: the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The Brazilian delegation fully shares that opinion. We have to point out, however, that time is running short and that, if we want to discharge at least part of the mandate which the General Assembly has entrusted to this Committee (ENDC/161), we should immediately embark upon the task of extending the Moscow Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) to underground nuclear tests.

(Mr. Azeredo da Silveira, Brazil)

For many reasons, the Brazilian delegation is convinced that we should tackle that question with the utmost sense of urgency. The apparent deadlock on the proliferation question is one of those reasons. Indeed, the banning of underground tests in itself would constitute a partial non-proliferation measure, since it would make the nuclear option of the present non-nuclear-weapon States much more expensive and difficult. The partial test-ban Treaty, even if it has not discouraged all flirtations with nuclear-weapon status, has been playing the part of a deterrent. The decision to "go nuclear" implies the carrying-out of experiments in defiance of the Treaty and of world conscience and public opinion.

Testing in the atmosphere is the best short-cut to becoming nuclear; the second best short-cut is testing underground. If we reached an agreement on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, we should be narrowing to the absolute minimum the tempting corridor leading to the possession of nuclear weapons; and so we are compelled to follow that path in order to carry out the General Assembly directives. Besides, we should bear in mind that what has been hindering the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty is a very slight disagreement, not on the substance of the matter but rather on the implementation of such a treaty.

Thus, one is almost compelled to think that at present the two super-Powers -- taking into account their own supreme national interests -- are in a position to come to grips with the issue and to reach an agreement. We all know, however, how quick is the pace of change in modern technology and consequently how brief can be the meeting of minds in the disarmament field. A sudden change -- a break-through on one side or on the other -- might suddenly offset the balance of wills which could have made an agreement possible. Let us suppose, for instance, that one of the super-Powers decides to embark upon the setting-up of what has been called the "anti-missile ballistic defence system" and that for that purpose it will need to carry out an extensive series of underground tests. In order to keep the present balance of power, the other super-Power will immediately embark upon the same path. Therefore the present chances of reaching an agreement on underground tests will vanish, perhaps for a long time.

After so many years of discussion and negotiations, where are we? At what conclusions have we arrived? Which ways have been paved towards an agreement? Let us pause and, for the sake of clarity, recollect the present stand of the United States and that of the Soviet Union.

(Mr. Azeredo da Silveira, Brazil)

Only a few days ago the representative of the United States, Mr. Foster, said:

"We have made it perfectly clear, and it is a scientifically known fact, that underground there are a number of events which it is impossible to identify. For that reason we ask for the verification of events which appear to have significance and for which, as far as we know -- and our own activities in this field have been more extensive perhaps than those of any other nation -- there are as yet no means of both detection and identification."

(ENDC/PV.271, p.33)

At the same meeting the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Roshchin, said:

"The Soviet Union has stated time and again that for the prohibition of underground nuclear tests, national means of detecting and identifying underground seismic events are sufficient. I should like to stress once again that precisely national means of detection, and not international on-site inspections, are the effective key that will enable us to achieve our aim of prohibiting completely all nuclear weapon tests. Hence the Soviet Union is prepared to reach an agreement on the cessation of all underground nuclear weapon tests on the basis of the use of national means of detection for verifying the fulfilment of the commitments in respect of the cessation of underground nuclear explosions." (ibid., p.22)

There is no difference between the position of the United States and that of the Soviet Union on the substance of the matter. On the contrary, both nations do agree on the necessity of banning underground tests. However, when they come to the method of implementing the treaty their views conflict. Both opinions are expressed with the utmost conviction. Thus the negotiating power of this Committee has been reduced considerably, and might come to an end if we do not succeed in finding some common ground.

But how could we move towards reaching that common ground? First of all, we should acknowledge that the stumbling-block is due to the conflicting scientific assessments of the problem. Thus it is on the scientific level that we should try to reach that common ground, by working out a system of implementation acceptable to all parties.

In order to be in a position to do so, we should ascertain whether or not national instruments can identify all underground nuclear tests. We could go further and try to ascertain -- if those instruments cannot identify all underground tests -- where the demarcation line falls, that is, up to what seismological magnitude those tests could be detected and identified. That raises another problem: who could answer those questions?

(Mr. Azeredo da Silveira, Brazil)

Before going into that particular subject let me assure all members of this Committee that it is not my intention to challenge the scientific views submitted here. Everyone knows that technological progress is approximately equal in the various countries -- particularly in the highly-industrialized societies -- but not always necessarily simultaneous. Progress and sophistication in seismological identification in some countries might be more advanced than in others; and this gap might be at the very root of the conflicting views, which are based upon the available scientific data.

Allow me to emphasize very clearly that in asking those questions I am not casting any doubt on the good faith of any nation and I am not advocating what could be called arbitration -- scientific arbitration. History teaches that States do not like to be judged. Therefore the answers to those questions would constitute mere information, simple data, and not a moral or political arbitral award. However, on the basis of the information supplied to us, this Committee could add impetus to its negotiating power and perhaps pave the way for a solution.

Now I ask again: who would answer those questions? In my opinion those questions should be addressed to an impartial body of scientists, recruited on a personal basis, from neutral countries.

Suppose the impartial scientists indicate the adequacy of national instruments to identify all underground tests. In that case we could negotiate a comprehensive test-ban agreement without verification in loco.

Let us now imagine that the impartial scientists say that at present national instruments do not identify all underground tests and that there is a small but hard core of minimum-range seismic events the nature of which cannot be identified. In that case we should concentrate our attention on different aspects of identification and verification in such a way as to banish any possibility of confusion between verification and identification.

In this connexion the Committee has already before it many suggestions. One on the prohibition of underground tests above a certain limit and by a gradual process was advanced a few years ago by the Brazilian delegation; and the same basic suggestion -- coupled with the idea of a moratorium -- has been advocated by the representative of the United Arab Republic (ENDC/PV.259).

We have also two other extremely interesting proposals: those put forward by the Mexican delegation for a panel of scientists (ENDC/PV.269, p.26) and by the Swedish delegation for a "detection club" and "inspection by challenge" (ENDC/PV.256, ENDC/154).

(Mr. Azeredo da Silveira, Brazil)

A famous historian once contended that the Hundred Years' War could have been avoided and that it had increased neither the power nor the glory of the confronting States. A nuclear war would last perhaps only a few hours; but no historian would survive or be born to indulge in the consolation of proving that it had been avoidable and that it had enriched neither the glory nor the power of mankind.

If man has enough ingenuity to tame the atom and to travel in outer space; if man has developed -- out of fear -- weapons of appalling power, weapons capable of obliterating man's life on earth; then man must be able to develop bold and far-sighted techniques of peace. Let us not be betrayed by boredom, impatience or despair. Let us go on trying every idea, every proposal, until we can "look into the seeds of time and see which grain shall grow and which shall not."

Mr. BLUSZTAJN (Poland): First of all, I should like to welcome back the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, the representative of the United States, Mr. Fisher, and the representative of Burma, U Maung Maung.

I think that since we resumed our discussions in June on a non-proliferation treaty we have succeeded in clarifying our positions and in narrowing the area of our disagreements. We all know that there are several fundamental issues which must be solved before we can embark upon a meaningful process of treaty drafting. We are also aware that there are other issues which we shall have to tackle before we can arrive at a satisfactory document commanding general acceptance. Finally, we realize that the question of non-proliferation is one of vital importance to all countries, which cannot be disposed of merely by an agreement between the two major alliances.

We also know that the discussion of the non-proliferation issue has developed within the framework of a specific political and strategic setting, and that in our attempt to set out our thoughts in proper treaty language we are following well-defined objectives. In other words, we all know what we want to achieve, and the two draft treaties are the expression of these intentions.

I think it is rather futile to argue whether from the purely legal point of view the United States draft (ENDC/152 and Add.1) and the Soviet Union draft (ENDC/164) are perfect examples of excellent draftsmanship or not. In my view, both drafts

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are clear, concise and comprehensive -- to use Lord Chalfont's yardstick (ENDC/PV.270, p.28) -- when set in relation to the major objectives they seek to achieve. Of course, no draft is perfect, as can be seen from a comparison of the first and second versions of the draft treaty submitted by the United States delegation. The second, from a purely drafting point of view, is an improvement on the first inasmuch as it expresses in a much clearer form the intentions and objectives of United States policy in the field of non-proliferation without affecting in the least the substance of that policy.

I am submitting these preliminary observations in order to make clear that at this stage of our debate I am less interested in a comparative study, article by article, of the two draft treaties before us than in a discussion of the fundamental issues of which these two drafts are only a reflection.

I should like now to turn to the very interesting and stimulating exposé by Lord Chalfont at our meeting of 5 July. Let me first dispose of one point raised by him. I wish to state that we are convinced that the West has "no wish to sign a treaty simply to break it" for its "own purposes" (ibid., p.27). We believe that if the West signed a non-proliferation treaty it would be "bound by its provisions", to quote again Lord Chalfont's words. The point is that we cannot agree on the extent of the obligations that such a non-proliferation treaty would entail. The West is willing to accept certain limitations, while it is unwilling to enter into a commitment that would exclude certain options which it wants to keep open.

Lord Chalfont states:

"... the Soviet Union, ... in matters like that now called 'nuclear sharing' is in fact hurling itself with enormous vigour against an open door. Many of the dangers which it outlines are fantasy; some of the so-called NATO plans ... have never been NATO plans at all; others have been proposals within the alliance that have been examined; some of them have been discussed; and some of them have been rejected". (ibid.).

I need hardly say that I do not consider that statement to be an accurate assessment of the attitude of the Soviet delegation or, for that matter, of the Polish delegation. But, whatever the case may be, Lord Chalfont, by stating his argument in those terms, misses the main point; for what affects our discussion here most is not the change

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in climate of the internal debates within NATO, although we cannot ignore them, but the hard fact that those plans and proposals regarding nuclear sharing which, according to Lord Chalfont, have never been NATO plans at all, or have been examined, discussed or rejected, are all compatible with the present wording of the United States draft treaty.

If it is really true that no such plans are contemplated within NATO, then the only reason which explains the Western reluctance to accept a wording that would rule them out under a non-proliferation treaty is the determination to keep several options open. Whatever our Western colleagues may say, the indisputable fact remains that the present version of the United States draft treaty is so tailored that it leaves a large margin of possibilities for so-called "hardware" solutions. It can even be argued that it allows for arrangements for nuclear sharing involving "mixed manning".

It seems to me that the main conclusion which can be drawn from Lord Chalfont's speech on 5 July is that the Western Powers regard their concept of non-proliferation as an issue which is not negotiable. Lord Chalfont says:

"Proliferation takes place if non-nuclear States acquire, either individually or collectively, the right or ability to use nuclear weapons by their own independent choice, that is, without a veto by a nuclear State". (ibid., p.30)

He goes on to say:

"If a non-nuclear State achieves the independent right to use nuclear weapons or if, without any such right, it acquires the ability to use them by a mere exercise of its independent will, then proliferation has taken place. This is the outline map of non-proliferation on which the United States draft is based: the clear requirement that the nuclear-weapon States must not transfer, and the non-nuclear weapon States must not acquire, the control of nuclear weapons". (ibid., p.31)

Then comes the main portion of his statement: "Within that framework we are open to any suggestion concerning the best way to achieve and preserve our objectives" (ibid.).

If I understand him correctly, Lord Chalfont would like to narrow our discussion to one issue: namely, that concerning the effectiveness of the control which is retained by the nuclear States and the nature of the machinery which is necessary to retain that control. In effect he seems to be trying to convince us that from that

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point of view the United States draft is perfect, since it provides for the veto of the nuclear Powers; it includes physical controls in the form of elaborate electronic devices; and, finally, it places the responsibility squarely upon the nuclear Power if the non-nuclear Power partner to a nuclear-sharing arrangement violates the treaty by using the atomic weapons which have been given to it.

Here is the essence of our disagreements. The Western delegations consider that dissemination with safeguards equals non-proliferation. They have made it clear that that is a position which they are unwilling to give up. All they are ready to discuss are suggestions regarding the effectiveness of the safeguards. The socialist delegations, on the other hand, cannot agree with that interpretation of the concept of non-proliferation. The only satisfactory safeguard against dissemination of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon Powers is, in our view, a non-proliferation treaty excluding all possibilities for a non-nuclear Power to gain control over nuclear weapons and to enter into physical possession of a nuclear weapon under whatever legal title.

The appeal by Lord Chalfont to the delegations of the socialist countries to show greater flexibility in their approach towards the solution of the problems before us, and his repeated assurances that the Western delegations are anxious to consider compromise proposals, are therefore in the opinion of the Polish delegation highly misleading; for there is for the time being no indication that the United States and its allies are ready and willing to negotiate on their basic concept of non-proliferation. I must say I gained the same impression from today's statement by Mr. Fisher; if I am wrong I shall be glad to be corrected. From what we have heard so far we cannot but conclude that the Western delegations' definition of non-proliferation is not negotiable. Their offer is limited only to suggestions regarding what the West considers to be the best way of translating that definition into practical action. Clearly that is not enough. It cannot be accepted as a basis for negotiation; it cannot lead to mutually-acceptable solutions.

Mr. ROSHCIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): First of all, may I, on behalf of my delegation, welcome here the representative of Burma, U Maung Maung? We hope that his participation in the Committee will be very useful to us and that his counsel will contribute to the successful examination of the questions on the Committee's agenda.

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

We should now like to deal only with some of the points raised today by the representative of the United States, Mr. Fisher. We shall study his statement as a whole later on and in due course we shall express our views on the points which he raised.

Today Mr. Fisher appealed to the Committee and to our delegation to make more persistent efforts to work for the achievement of a common position on the question of non-proliferation. In this connexion we must point out that in this case, of course, it is not appeals nor, I would say, words that are needed, but rather specific acts or specific proposals on the part of the United States that would really enable us to make progress in the consideration of this question.

From our point of view the question of non-proliferation is absolutely clear, and here there cannot be any misunderstanding. In the consideration of this question one of the basic principles is the requirement that there shall be no transfer of nuclear weapons by a nuclear Power to non-nuclear States. That is the essence of the question of non-proliferation. That was mentioned, in particular, by the Minister for External Affairs of Ireland, Mr. Aiken, at the sixteenth session of the General Assembly (A/C.1/PV.1209, p.37) when explaining the Irish draft resolution on non-proliferation (A/RES/1665 (XVI)). It was in the light of that explanation that the resolution on non-proliferation was voted upon at the session of the General Assembly (A/RES/2028 (XX); ENDC/161) and the United States also voted for it.

Why, then, has the United States now radically revised its position on the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons? In fact, if we make a careful and profound study of the United States draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (ENDC/152 and Add.1), we are bound to come to the conclusion that this draft does not contain a requirement of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. Indeed, it contains a different requirement: namely, a restriction of the use of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear States subject to the consent of a nuclear Power.

Therefore, when we talk about non-proliferation here in the Committee, we talk about this from absolutely different positions, from radically different premises. The Soviet Union and the socialist countries say that non-proliferation must include, as its most important element, the non-transfer of nuclear weapons by a nuclear Power to a non-nuclear State. That is the basic premise, and that is how it was interpreted by the General Assembly and by the Minister for External Affairs of Ireland, the sponsor of the resolution. The United States has submitted to us a draft treaty, not on non-proliferation but -- and I stress this once again -- on a restriction of the use of nuclear weapons, a restriction which consists in the consent of a nuclear Power to this use.

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Non-proliferation properly so-called is not directly provided for by the United States draft. That there will be proliferation of nuclear weapons geographically and physically is beyond all doubt. That was mentioned by the representative of Mexico (ENDC/PV.274). It cannot be denied that the United States draft provides for physical proliferation, geographical proliferation and, we add to this, political proliferation. Why? Because a non-nuclear State would in fact have access to nuclear weapons. That is why, in assessing the United States position on the question of non-proliferation, we must say that its position is not that of non-proliferation or the prevention of proliferation, but that of preventing the use of nuclear weapons by a non-nuclear State without the consent of a nuclear Power. That is the essence of the United States concept.

When we are now told, "Let us reach agreement on the question of non-proliferation; let us reach agreement on secondary provisions", we must say that an altogether inconceivable situation is being created. It is impossible to reach agreement by starting out from diametrically-opposed concepts. In one case it is a question of proliferation; in the other it is a question of a restriction on the use of nuclear weapons by a non-nuclear State subject to the consent of a nuclear Power. That is the gist of the matter.

When there is talk about secondary provisions, we must say that these are governed by, and depend on, the primary ones. Let us take the only substantive provision which seems to be similar in the Soviet and the United States drafts: that relating to prohibition of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and assistance in their manufacture. The representative of Italy, Mr. Cavalletti, asked on 21 July "whether he considers absolutely negligible the agreement" on this problem (ENDC/PV.275, p.35). In this connexion we should like to stress that the provision prohibiting the manufacture of nuclear weapons and assistance in their manufacture would be suspended in mid-air if we had no agreement that the transfer of nuclear weapons should be regarded as proliferation.

Indeed, let us assume that agreement has been reached in the Committee not to provide assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons, but at the same time certain nuclear Powers consider themselves entitled to transfer the actual nuclear

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weapons. In this connexion one may well ask what an agreement to prohibit the manufacture of nuclear weapons would amount to if a non-nuclear State could, by agreement with a nuclear Power, obtain access to these weapons. In that case an agreement to prohibit the manufacture of nuclear weapons and assistance in their manufacture would lose all its meaning as a result of transferring nuclear weapons to a non-nuclear State. Even this substantive provision, to which attention was drawn today by the United States representative and at the last meeting by the Italian representative (ibid.), even this provision, apparently very important, would be reduced to nothing, to emptiness, because a non-nuclear State would be able to obtain nuclear weapons from a nuclear Power and thus there would be no solution of the problem itself of preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons.

That is why we say that to record agreed formulas would be appropriate only if there were a uniform concept and agreement in regard to the essence of measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. So long as we have radical differences in regard to the concept of non-proliferation, any similarities between provisions of a secondary, derivative nature will have a deceptive appearance. To record this similarity would be in any case tantamount to creating a false idea of the real situation and the appearance of progress where in fact there has been none whatever.

In this connexion the Soviet delegation deems it necessary to stress once again that, in the absence of agreement on the basic articles of a draft treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, or even on the essence of the concept of non-proliferation, to create the idea of some sort of progress in the negotiations on the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would spread false illusions about the state of affairs in this regard, and that would simply be leading astray the public opinion of States about the situation in regard to the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Thus I wish to say once again that we must first work out the concept and reach agreement on the basic questions of principle; because otherwise everything else would be altogether illusory. We should be indulging in self-delusion if we were to reach agreement on some other questions mentioned here by the United States representative, Mr. Fisher, and by the representative of Italy, Mr. Cavalletti, and also by you, Mr. Chairman, as the representative of Canada. The Soviet delegation

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cannot agree with that concept or that method of work, because it would be absolutely fruitless and unproductive. With that I conclude our preliminary remarks in connexion with the statement made today by Mr. Fisher.

Mr. FISHER (United States of America): I have listened with interest to the thoughtful observations of the representatives of Poland and the Soviet Union and shall study them. I wish to make only a brief observation at this time.

I think that from a study of the United States proposal it will be clear that it was not intended to foreclose efforts to reconcile any of the issues on which we currently disagree. From a study of the remarks made it will be clear, for example, that the suggestion dealing with manufacture is not a proposal that we should deal with manufacture alone; it is merely a proposal for a method of negotiation. We should deal with the various agreed areas first, with a full recognition that before we come to a final agreement we shall have to agree on all issues outstanding between us. It is a proposal advanced merely as the best way to arrive at such an agreement.

I may wish to comment further after I have had a chance to analyse the thoughtful remarks of the two preceding speakers. That is all I wish to say at this time.

The CHAIRMAN (Canada): Before I read the communiqué, perhaps the Committee will permit me, on behalf of the Canadian delegation, to welcome back U Maung Maung of Burma to our midst. I hope he will be able to participate in our deliberations for some time and help us in our work. With the Committee's permission I would make that statement also on behalf of those representatives who have not yet had the opportunity to welcome back the Burmese Ambassador.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 276th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador E.L.M. Burns, representative of Canada.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Bulgaria, the United States, Brazil, Poland and the Soviet Union.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 28 July 1966, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.10 p.m.